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InterGroup Coalitions and Immigration
Politics: The Haitian Experience in Florida
PREPARED BY CHERYL LITTLE
SEPTEMBER 3, 1998
Lamar Smith, a Republican from Texas who chairs the House
Immigration Subcommittee, has gone on the offensive recently in an
effort to block any legislative effort to provide Haitians relief similar to
that accorded various groups last year under the Nicaraguan Adjustment
and Central American Relief Act (NACARA). NACARA benefits
nationals of Nicaragua, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, the former Soviet
Union and Warsaw pact countries. According to Congressman Smith,
Haitians should not be provided similar relief because "Haitians have
been treated better by the United States than refugees from almost any
other nation."
Nothing could be further from the truth. Despite the well-docu-
mented political repression in Haiti during the Duvalier regime and mili-
tary governments that followed, refugees from Haiti, the world's first
Black Republic, have been singled out for special discriminatory treat-
ment and the fundamental principles of refugee protection abandoned
time and again.
The first boatload of Haitians claiming persecution in Haiti arrived
in the United States in September 1963. All twenty-three refugees were
denied political asylum and deported, signaling the wave of rejection to
come.
Despite the bloody outcome of the aborted election in Haiti in
1987, not a single Haitian was granted asylum that year by the INS.
Between June 1983 and March 1991, only 1.8 percent of Haitian appli-
cants in the United States were granted asylum by the INS, the lowest
approval rate among nationalities submitting the largest number of
applications.' Those fleeing communist regimes fared much better: the
approval rate during that period for China was 69.0 percent and for the
former Soviet Union, 74.5 percent. The overall approval rate for all
applicants was 23.6 percent. Even when approval rates for Haitians
increased after reform of the asylum system in the early 1990's and the
1. Between 1986 and 1991, only 28 Haitians were granted asylum. In 1986, 5 Haitians were
granted asylum; in 1988, 8; in 1989, 11; in 1990, 3; and in 1991, 1. These figures are generous,
since many other Haitians who would have applied for asylum did not do so because the odds
were so great against their claims being fairly considered.
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1991 coup d'etat that ousted President Aristide, they remained far below
the approval rates for other nationalities.2
In the early 1980's, a landmark suit was filed on behalf of over
4,000 Haitians requesting political asylum. The INS, through proce-
dures in effect at that time, had denied all 4,000 applications. The court
found that United States government agencies had set up a "Haitian Pro-
gram" designed specifically to adjudicate, and to deny, as quickly as
possible, the asylum claims of Haitians. The program "in its planning
and executing [was] offensive to every notion of constitutional due pro-
cess and equal protection."
The Court concluded that the backlog of 6000-7000 Haitian cases
- which the government had argued constituted the reasons for instigat-
ing the Haitian Program - was not a result of a massive influx of Hai-
tians to South Florida over a short period, but rather was primarily
attributable to a slow trickle of Haitians over a ten-year period, and to
the confessed inaction of the INS in dealing with these cases. Moreover,
the court concluded that the INS was engaging in scare tactics, noting
that the INS Deputy Commissioner encouraged government attorneys to
point out "THE DIMENSIONS OF THE HAITIAN THREAT" and
called the Haitian cases a threat to the community's social and economic
well-being. The court also found that the discriminatory treatment of
Haitians was nothing new, but rather that it was part of a pattern of
discrimination which began in 1964.
In late May, 1981, the INS began to systematically detain Haitians
entering the United States. This was a fundamental change from the
established policy of detaining only those persons deemed likely to
abscond or pose a threat to national security.
In July, 1981, the State of Florida brought an action against the
Federal Government due to the overcrowded conditions at Krome Ser-
vice Processing Center, the INS detention facility in Miami. During liti-
gation, the government promised that efforts would be made to keep the
population at Krome at or under one-thousand people. In order to abide
by this representation, the INS transferred Haitians out of Krome when-
ever the population exceeded one-thousand.
Advocates for the Haitian refugees again turned to the courts for
help, and again the courts noted the INS's callous disregard for the
2. Given the grave political situation in Haiti following the 1991 ouster of President
Aristide, the number of Haitians granted asylum in the aftermath of the coup was alarmingly low.
In 1992, 120 Haitians were granted asylum by the INS, representing a 30.6 percent approval rate,
which still lagged far behind the approval rate in 1992 for Chinese applicants (84.8 percent) and
applicants from the former Soviet Union (49.8 percent). In 1993, 636 Haitians were granted
asylum; in 1994, 1060; in 1995, 749; and in 1996, 1,491. Moreover, any meaningful increase in
the approval rate was temporary.
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rights of Haitian refugees. A federal court judge in 1982 characterized
the transfers as "a human shell game in which the arbitrary Immigration
and Naturalization Service has sought to scatter [Haitians] to locations
that ... are all in desolate, remote, hostile, culturally diverse areas, con-
taining a paucity of available legal support and few, if any, Creole
interpreters."
A successor judge in the same case subsequently ruled that the Hai-
tians were "impacted to a greater degree by the new detention policy
than aliens of any other nationality. . . ." Unlike other aliens, the Hai-
tians were subject to mass exclusion hearings behind closed doors,
improperly denied access to their attorneys, and deported in a manner
INS itself admitted was faulty. The detention policy was found to be
invalid and the court ordered the release of over one-thousand Haitians,
provided they were deemed neither a security risk nor likely to abscond.
The government appealed the district court decision and in an his-
toric decision, an Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals panel found that
statistical evidence disclosed that the federal government had engaged in
a "stark pattern" of discrimination against the Haitian asylum seekers.
This was the first time in the history of American law that the federal
government was found to have discriminated on the basis of race or
national origin under the Constitution in a non-employment context.
Although the Court of Appeals en banc later vacated the decision on the
grounds that the Haitians had no constitutional rights, they never dis-
turbed the factual findings of the panel opinion.
Moreover, despite the court's order that the INS stop illegal trans-
fers of Haitians to remote areas of the country, such transfers continued.
In May 1989, a federal judge in Miami blocked the forced transfer of
dozens of Haitians, this time from Krome to Louisiana and Texas during
a "lock down" of the INS facility. The judge found that the circum-
stances under which the transfers took place violated the Haitians' due
process rights.
Even when INS Commissioner Gene McNary implemented a more
liberal parole policy in May 1990, the Haitians failed to benefit. "Nearly
one month into the program no Haitians had been approved for parole in
Miami even though Haitians constituted nearly two-thirds of those
detained in the district," reads a section of the report written by the Law-
yers Committee for Human Rights in New York.
Haitians have also carefully documented their mistreatment at
Krome, which led to a 1990 FBI and Justice Department investigation
into allegations of physical and sexual abuse by Krome officers. While
Justice Department officials claimed in March 1991 that the investiga-
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tion was completed, to date no findings have been made public.3 Two
New York Times articles in June 1992 addressed the ongoing abuses
directed against the Haitians at Krome, reporting that "[d]uring a hunger
strike.., to protest the death of one such detainee, 185 Haitians interned
at Krome charged that they had been beaten, harassed, and deprived of
medical care, of their Bibles, and of contact with their lawyers and rela-
tives."4 Some Krome guards even told the Haitians "you are all HIV-
positive anyway ... ."' A Justice Department news release in January,
1996 announced that a Krome officer had pled guilty to one felony count
of depriving a Haitian detainee of his civil rights by beating and kicking
him and trying to cover up what he had done.
In a letter written by Haitian detainees at Krome following the Sep-
tember, 1991 military coup in Haiti, they pleaded with INS officials to
ensure that their asylum claims be fairly considered:
"Today we do not want to be demanding or to arouse anyone's
anger but we want to make known our patriotic thoughts, the testimony
of our feelings concerning the loss of our relatives and our ancestors
who are being abused and murdered by the recent events. Look at the
life of the Haitian people; there is a law for all people: in the eyes of
God they are all equal, and they all have the same liberty and the same
privileges, which are owed to every one of them. . . . We wish to
emphasize ...that right now we are living in the most difficult and
painful times of human life. . . .We prefer to die than to live in the
uncertainty that drowns our thoughts."
Earlier in the year, Florida Senators Bob Graham and Connie Mack
unsuccessfully pushed for legislation to limit detention at Krome to
ninety days. In late September, 1992, Amnesty International, USA, crit-
3. Over two-hundred written and videotaped statements of Krome detainees, ex-detainees,
former Krome employees, attorneys, and paralegals were collected by attorneys at the Haitian
Refugee Center in Miami between 1989 and early 1991, painting a picture of cycles of humiliation
and abuse directed in large part against the Haitians at the whim of certain guards. In the spring of
1990, Florida Representative Dante Fascell, who headed the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
called for an FBI investigation, labeling the documentation of wrongdoing against Haitians at
Krome "disturbing and indicat[ing] that longstanding abuses at the center remain uncorrected."
Less than a year later, a Haitian woman detained at Krome was allegedly raped by a guard. She
remained in detention for another two months, claiming her attacker was still on the job, although
the INS knew of her charges shortly after the incident in question. INS's reaction to the public
airing of allegations of abuse at Krome was not encouraging. A teacher and a nurse who spoke to
reporters about such abuses were subsequently dismissed. Another teacher was let go after
complaining to Miami INS officials about confiscation disposal of Haitian detainees' belongings,
including Bibles and books.
4. Larry Rohter, Processing for Haitians is Time in a Rural Prison," N.Y. TIMES, June 21,
1992, at 18.
5. Larry Rohter, U.S. Accused of Abuse of Haitians at a Center, N.Y. TIMEs, June 5, 1992, at
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icized the lengthy detention of Haitians at Krome, claiming that govern-
ments should reveal legitimate grounds for any detention of asylum
seekers. In 1993, Miami Mayor Xavier Suarez, a Cuban American,
requested the closing of Krome, calling it an unnecessary burden on tax-
payers and an insult to Haitian asylum seekers. Suarez said it would
make more sense to release the Haitians from Krome into the custody of
relatives or church groups, and allow them to work and support them-
selves. Suarez estimated the average cost of detaining two-hundred
individuals for nine months to be about five million dollars.
Haitians at Krome have engaged in serious hunger strikes to protest
their treatment. One of these occurred in January, 1993 following the
arrival of fifty-two Cubans who had "commandeered" a Cuban com-
muter flight from Havana to Varadero, Cuba, diverting it to Miami. All
the Cubans were released from Krome within forty-eight hours, while
the Haitians remained in custody. To the Haitians, this was a painful
reminder of the double standard of treatment.
The following year, hundreds of Haitians were housed in tents at
Krome, including many women and children, leading to widespread
complaints of inadequate and oppressive living conditions. A lawsuit
was filed in 1995 on behalf of a number of detained Haitians, which
resulted in improved access to attorneys and medical care. The INS,
however, failed to live up to the settlement agreement and attorneys for
the Haitians have had to continue to fight on the Haitians' behalf. In
May, 1998 attorneys attempting to help dozens of Haitians at Krome
were denied access to them for ten days. The INS said it was waiting for
test results to confirm the Haitians were disease free, even though the
head of the medical unit at Krome said the Haitians did not need to be
quarantined.
Haitians outside the United States who wished to apply for refugee
status or who tried to reach the United States to apply for asylum faced
even greater obstacles. As a result of a 1981 agreement between US and
Haitian officials, Haitians attempting to flee Haiti and seek asylum were
not permitted to reach the United States The Haitian interdiction pro-
gram was established by the Reagan Administration in September, 1981
after determining that undocumented Haitians coming to the United
States had "threatened the welfare and safety of [our] communities,"
even though Haitians comprised less than two percent of the undocu-
mented population of the United States at that time. Haiti was the only
foreign government with which the United States had such an agreement
and it was entered into under United States' threats to remove economic
aid to Haiti. Critics of the Haitian interdiction program frequently
referred to it as the "floating Berlin wall."
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Interdicted Haitian refugees were conveniently termed "economic
immigrants" by United States authorities, despite overwhelming evi-
dence of gross violations under "Baby Doc" Duvalier, who assured
United States officials that the refugees would not be persecuted.6 And
while the 1981 agreement clearly specified that bona fide refugees were
not to be returned to Haiti, and the INS's own instructions cautioned
INS officers to be "keenly attuned" to any evidence that someone was
fleeing political persecution, the INS determined that only twenty-eight
of the more than 24,000 Haitians intercepted in the decade following the
program's inception were qualified to apply for asylum in the United
States. Twenty of these were brought to the United States after the
United States INS instituted several changes in the pre-screening
interdiction process, which took effect March 1, 1991, after President
Aristide took power. Consequently, almost three times more Haitians
were deemed political refugees under a democratic government than
during an entire decade marked by human rights abuses and tyranny.
In the decade preceding President Aristide's election, Haitians sent
back to their country were often persecuted. Even the courts found that
Haitians deported back to Haiti during this time were sometimes subject
to surveillance, arrest, questioning, jailing and beatings, all without due
process of the law.
In June, 1989, the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees
presented an affidavit to the United States House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law. The
affidavit was from returned Haitians who alleged that their stated fears
of political persecution in Haiti were ignored by United States immigra-
tion authorities. One politically active Haitian, who was interdicted and
returned to Haiti in March, 1989, told of Haitian soldiers having shot
him four times in the legs at the time of his arrest in January, 1988 and
his ten anguishing months in prison. Referring to his interview aboard
the Coast Guard cutter, after he managed to flee Haiti, he stated: "I told
them of my circumstances and specifically said that I preferred to kill
myself instead of returning to Haiti. They returned me anyway."
During Aristide's tenure, prior to the coup, the number of refugees
attempting to reach the United States dropped dramatically. The Coast
Guard reported that during some months of Aristide's term, they did not
encounter a single Haitian vessel. United States officials reportedly
attributed this to the new hope Haitians had for improved conditions
under the newly elected government. This supports other statistics indi-
6. Former Haitian President Prosper Avril has stated that he believes the Haiti interdiction
agreement is illegal under Haitian law, since an exchange of diplomatic letters is not a proper
method of entering into a bilateral agreement with another country.
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cating that the number of Haitians fleeing by boat in large measure
reflects the political climate in Haiti.
Shortly after the 1991 coup d'etat in Haiti, and amid widespread
reports of brutal attacks on Aristide supporters, attorneys at the Haitian
Refugee Center (HRC) in Miami learned that the United States Coast
Guard was about to forcibly return 538 "screened out" Haitians who had
been found not to have a credible fear of return to Haiti.7 One day later,
on November 19, 1991, HRC filed a lawsuit challenging the forced repa-
triation of Haitians without any meaningful consideration of their asy-
lum claims. At the time the suit was filed, only about fifty of the more
than eighteen-hundred Haitians interviewed had been "screened in."
Testimony revealed that the pre-screening interviews were a complete
sham - a formal validation of a predetermined result.
The interviews, many of which had been conducted on board Coast
Guard cutters before Haitians had time to rest or recover from illness,
often lasted no more than five minutes. The INS officers interviewing
the Haitians had virtually no knowledge of Haitian politics or culture
and could not name or recognize the following: The President and
Prime Minister of the de facto regime, the General (Cedras) at the head
of the military coup, the popular name for President Aristide (Titid), Ti-
Legliz (church movement of President Aristide), Lafanmi Selavi
(orphanage established by President Aristide), and many others. A high-
ranking government official at one point even said the interviews were
so defective they needed to be halted.
The HRC lawsuit did not challenge the interdiction program or ask
the court to bring all interdicted Haitians to the United States. It simply
asked that the Haitians receive fair screening interviews before repatria-
tion continued.
Although District Court Judge Clyde C. Atkins issued three sepa-
rate restraining orders in favor of the Haitians, three times the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals stayed or vacated the judge's orders. The
Appeals Court found that the Haitians had no legally enforceable rights
in the United States because they were outside United States territory.
The "catch-22" nature of this finding was not lost on Judge Hatchett, the
one African-American judge on the Appeals panel, who remarked in a
dissenting opinion: "Haitians, unlike other aliens from anywhere in the
world, are prevented from freely reaching the continental United States.
In a brief two sentence order issued without comment on January
31, 1992, the Supreme Court voted to permit repatriations. Justice
7. From October 29, 1991 until November 18, 1991, the United States refrained from
repatriating the Haitians and brought them to Guantnamo. On November 18, 1991, the
government resumed repatriations.
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Blackmun alone wrote: "If indeed the Haitians are to be returned to an
uncertain future in their strife-torn homeland, that ruling should come
from this Court after full and careful consideration of the merits of their
claims."
Lawyers for the Haitians argued that the legal issues took a back
seat to political maneuvering. Indeed, the government sent then Solici-
tor General Kenneth W. Starr to argue its position before the District
Court in Miami, although Solicitors General generally only argue cases
in particularly important United States Supreme Court cases. The argu-
ment signaled the effort United States officials would engage in to keep
Haitians out of the United States. More specifically, the Haitians' attor-
neys argued that government lawyers manufactured affidavits, rushed
courts to judgment, and deliberately misled the courts with false claims
of national emergency and military necessity. On January 28, 1992, for
example, the government filed an emergency petition for a stay of the
ban on repatriations with the Eleventh Circuit, alleging that 20,000 Hai-
tians "were massed" on the Haitian beaches and waiting to head for
Guant~inamo, and that the naval base could not accommodate such num-
bers. Three days later, and before the Eleventh Circuit had ruled, the
government went to the Supreme Court with the same allegations.
Attorneys for the Haitians argued that this was a "self created" crisis and
that Guantdnamo had a far greater capacity to hold people than the
Administration claimed. They charged that Under Secretary Bernard
Aronson admitted that the term "massing" was ambiguous and retracted
his use of the word; contrary to the statements in his declaration to the
Supreme Court, he admitted that he was quite unsure of the number of
Haitians preparing to leave. Independent observers, including the Coast
Guard attache in Port-au-Prince who flew over the Haitian shores of La
Gonave, the point of departure for many Haitians, concluded there was
no evidence of Haitians "massing." Moreover, during 1994-1995,
Guantinamo held over 32,000 Cubans and over 21,000 Haitians and
United States officials claimed they could facilitate an endless number
of arrivals.
In their brief to the Supreme Court, lawyers for the Haitians also
referred to the government reliance on the declaration of Robert K.
Wolthuis, whom the government presented as the Assistant Secretary of
Defense. Mr. Wolthuis, according to the Haitians' lawyers, had
assumed that position for one day only - the day he signed the declara-
tion. Mr. Wolthuis readily admitted that most of the facts he swore to in
his declaration were what the lawyers who had drafted it told him. The
declaration was so defective that attorneys for the Haitians filed a sepa-
rate memorandum concerning it.
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In denying attorneys for the Haitians access to Guantdnamo and the
Coast Guard cutters, the government claimed that it would seriously
interfere with military operations. Judge Atkins noted, however, the
portions of the military base to which the attorneys sought access were
not used for military purposes. Furthermore, Coast Guard Admiral Wil-
liam P. Leahy acknowledged in his deposition that press members, VIPs,
and a host of other persons had access to Guantdnamo, and he admitted
that family members of Coast Guard members periodically traveled on
Coast Guard cutters, including his fourteen year old son who spent two
weeks on a cutter during a law enforcement mission.
Lawyers also charged that summary dismissals on critical decisions
were issued, affidavits not a part of the record were treated as if they
were, and key parts of the record were ignored. At one point Judge
Hatchett, the Eleventh Circuit Court's dissenting judge, felt compelled
to claim that the panel majority was deciding the case under "some pro-
cedures here before unknown to the law" and that "[t]he majority's
actions, ruling, and holdings ... are inconsistent with its actions, hold-
ings and rulings of two days ago ......
Indeed, the State Department and Bush Administration did an
excellent job of diverting attention away from the legal issues and con-
vincing the courts and the public that denying the Haitians their legal
rights was in the best interest of everyone.8 From day one of the coup,
United States government officials were predicting that hundreds of
thousands of Haitians would leave their country and head for the United
States. Although when running for The Presidency, Bill Clinton said he
was "appalled" at Bush's policy of forcibly repatriating the Haitians,
once elected his Administration began predicting the Haitian exodus
would make the Cuban Mariel exodus "look like a picnic." Yet only
about 40,000 Haitians fled their country following the 1991 coup up
until Bush's Kennebunkport order, eight months later. That is far less
8. It has been suggested that the media played a role in influencing public opinion. One
report indicated that newspaper stories in four major American newspapers "systematically
distorted the human rights record of President Aristide while underplaying the terror practiced by
the coup government." The Press and Haiti: Systematic Distortions and Omissions, September
1991 - June 1992, HAITI COMMUNICATIONS PROJECT (Boston Media Action, Somerville,
Mass.), Feb. 1993, at 1. The four newspapers evaluated were the N.Y. Times, the Boston Globe,
the Washington Post, and the Miami Herald. A public opinion poll conducted by the Miami
Herald and a local Miami television station in December 1992 also revealed that 57 percent of
Florida residents believed that Haitians should be allowed to stay in the United States until it was
safe to return to Haiti. Elizabeth Grudzinski, Bush, Florida Split on Haitians; 57% in State Poll
Favor Letting Refugees Stay - For Now, MIAMI HERALD, December 13, 1991, at IA. However, a
Mason Dixon poll conducted about six months later, from May 29 to 31, 1992, indicated that
Florida voters overwhelmingly felt the United States could not afford to let the Haitians in and
concluded they were simply economic refugees. Lizette Alvarez, Florida Split on Haiti Policy,
MiAMi HERALD, June 5, 1992, at IA.
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than the 125,000 Cubans who arrived in four months during the Mariel
Boat lift in 1980. 9
Government officials claimed their effort to forcibly return the Hai-
tians was inspired by the desire to save the lives of those who would
otherwise be encouraged to take to the sea in unworthy vessels (the so-
called "magnet" effect). But as Appeals Court Judge Hatchett pointed
out: "The primary purpose of the [interdiction] program was, and has
continued to be, to keep Haitians out of the United States."'
10
When repatriations began again on February 1, 1992, more than
11,000 Haitians were held at Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba. Amnesty Interna-
tional expressed outrage at the forced returns. In a January, 1992 report,
Amnesty International said it had received reports of grave human rights
violations after the coup d'etat. Amnesty stated they knew of "several
cases in the past years where asylum-seekers who were refused asylum
in the United States and returned to Haiti were imprisoned and in some
cases ill-treated on their return."
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR")
similarly condemned the repatriations, expressing fear that those
returned would be exposed to real danger. Just before the Supreme
Court decision allowing repatriations to continue, UNHCR confirmed
that dozens of Haitian refugees returned to Haiti due to faulty proce-
dures were persecuted upon their return and forced to flee a second time.
The UNHCR said that they and United States government officials had
documents detailing the harassment, beating, torture, and murder of
9. Over 200,000 Cubans also came to the United States in an organized airlift between 1959
and 1962.
10. A look at our treatment of those Haitians who were "screened-in" at Guantinamo but who
allegedly tested positive for the HIV virus unfortunately supports the argument that we are not
interested in saving the lives of Haitians. In late 1991, United States government officials began
testing these Haitians for the HIV virus. Prior to 1992, no person who applied for asylum at a
border or in the United States was ever excluded for being HIV-positive, and Cubans interdicted
at the same time and literally in the same boat as Haitians were immediately transported to the
United States and allowed to enter the asylum program without ever being medically screened for
HIV. The Haitians were housed at Guantinamo in tin-roofed shacks surrounded by barbed wire,
denied adequate legal representation, and occasionally suffered punitive measures handed out
without any procedural rights. Doctors from the Center for Disease Control warned the Navy that
the Haitians should not be crowded together in a camp such as Guantdnamo because that could
exacerbate their medical condition, and senior Health and Human Service officials, including
former Secretary Sullivan, wanted the restriction on the Haitians lifted, as did international health
authorities. In reviewing the legality of the confinement of these Haitians, the court found that
"The Haitians' plight is a tragedy of immense proportion and their continued detainment is totally
unacceptable..." On June 8, 1993 the court ordered the government to release the approximately
two-hundred screened-in Haitians immediately from Guantdinamo Bay "to anywhere but Haiti"
and to allow them access to counsel after almost two years of imprisonment at Guantdinamo Bay.
In response to the court order, the government allowed those remaining at Guantinamo Bay to
enter the United States and pursue asylum claims.
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returned Haitians for the "crime" of having fled.'" After the UNHCR
publicly confirmed that they had such evidence, they were informed
they could no longer conduct interviews of the Haitians at Guantdnamo
without a military presence.
To exacerbate matters, testimony by a senior official of the General
Accounting Office before a House sub-committee revealed that the INS
had lost at least twenty-five hundred files at Guantdnamo due to disor-
ganization and disarray, mistook "screened-in" Haitians for "screened-
out" Haitians, and apparently rescreened and even repatriated previously
"screened-in" Haitians. Those erroneously returned included at least
thirty-eight unaccompanied children and a 16-year old girl, Marie Zette,
who was killed in her bed by Tonton Macoutes the first night after her
forced return.
Attorneys for the Haitians argued that many of the Haitians inter-
dicted after the September coup were not headed to the United States in
the first place, but to the Bahamas, Cuba or other destinations. The gov-
ernment advanced no explanation, the attorneys said, as to their author-
ity or justification in interfering with those Haitians attempting to escape
political persecution in Haiti, let alone to forcibly return them to Haiti. 2
The decision by the high court not to review the HRC case paved
the way for further abuses of Haitian refugees. Indeed, after the
Supreme Court order, the INS was free to "screen in" all light-skinned
Haitians and "screen out" all dark-skinned Haitians, since this would not
be subject to legal challenge. Yet many were surprised when President
Bush issued his May 24, 1992 Executive Order stopping all Haitian
interviews and permitting the INS to repatriate Haitians interdicted at
sea without any investigation into the likelihood of their persecution in
Haiti ("Kennebunkport Order"). 3
The United States government's response to the widespread con-
demnation of the Kennebunkport Order was to claim that Haitians in
11. Attorneys for the Haitians learned of this less than fifty-six hours before filing their
petitions for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. The Haitians' attorneys claimed that the
government precluded them from obtaining this information in a timely fashion.
12. Haitians and their advocates were aware that the same Coast Guard that searched for
Haitians also searched for Cubans, but that regardless of what the individual Cubans and Haitians
had to say, the Coast Guard operated with the intention of returning Haitians to Haiti, and with the
intention of bringing all the Cubans they found safely to the United States. In 1991, 2203 Cubans
came to the United States on boats or rafts, and in 1992, 2205 did. At the same time that Haitians
were being forcibly repatriated from Guantinamo in 1991 and 1992, Cubans who made it to the
United States Navel Base were flown to the United States and paroled into the community.
13. The Bush Administration's handling of the Haitian refugee crisis was a striking contrast
to the Cuban freedom flotillas in the early 1960's and United States' handling of the Vietnamese
in the 1970's. Indeed, the United States vehemently criticized the forced return by British Hong
Kong of the Vietnamese Boat People.
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fear for their lives could apply for asylum at the United States Embassy
in Port-au-Prince, and in January, 1992 announced the opening of an
office there to process refugee applications. Haitian refugee advocates
argued that to expect Haitian refugees to openly approach the United
States Embassy - just a block away from the police station and sur-
rounded by military personnel - was preposterous. Indeed, the Secre-
tary General of Amnesty International United States remarked in June,
1992:
"The idea that people suffering repression and at risk of human
rights violations, at risk of arbitrary detention, at risk of beating, at risk
of torture, and perhaps even death ... the idea that such people should
contemplate visiting the United States Embassy in Port-au-Prince,
should dare to stroll down the boulevard under the gaze of men in dark
glasses who lounge on street corners, such an idea is ridiculous."
Haitian advocates pointed out as well that Haitians in the rural
areas, where most of the severe repression was taking place, had no way
of getting to the capital and that there was such a high threshold for
approval of cases and such extensive documentary proof required of
Haitians that very few qualified for refugee status. In fact, many Hai-
tians who sought protection at the United States Embassy were subse-
quently arrested or otherwise mistreated by military authorities and, in
some cases, killed.
In June, 1992, Americas Watch and the National Coalition for Hai-
tian Refugees criticized the skewed United States monitoring of Haitians
repatriated since the coup, alleging it had served a public relations pur-
pose only and had utterly failed to discover whether repatriates encoun-
tered persecution. Florida Senator Connie Mack, a Republican, was an
outspoken critic of the Bush Administration's Haitian policy, calling it
"morally wrong" and "a disgrace." Republican Congresswoman Ileana
Ros-Lehtinen at one point labeled the forced return an "unfair situation."
Still, in early October, 1992, lacking the political clout of their Cuban
counterparts, Haitian refugees suffered one final blow under the 102d
Congress when legislation to reverse President Bush's Kennebunkport
order failed to reach a vote of the full Congress."
According to a report by the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, Coast Guard cutters which once figured so heavily in drug
interdiction were subsequently diverted to capture and return people
14. Given the failure of several broader Haiti-focused bills to progress during 1992, H.R.
5360 sought only to make explicit the United States obligation under international law not to
forcibly return political refugees found at sea as well as within United States territory. See H.R.
5360, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). President Bush had threatened to veto any bill protecting the
Haitians that passed Congress.
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fleeing one of the most dreaded tyrannies in the Caribbean. INS 5
Interdiction Chief Leon Jeannings admitted that most of the intercepted
Haitian boats were destroyed so other Haitians wouldn't use them to
leave. This prompted Miami Mayor Xavier Suarez to distribute bumper
stickers in 1992 that read "Interdict Drugs, Not Haitians." Congressman
Claude Pepper, shortly before his death, had unsuccessfully attempted to
pass a bill that directed the United States to bring Haitians ashore for
their asylum interviews.
Representative Lamar Smith's recent assertion that the Guantd-
namo Haitians were "paroled into the United States.. ., spared deporta-
tion proceedings and allowed to pursue asylum," belies the fact that
those Haitians who were "screened-in" at Guantdnamo in 1991 and 1992
were only allowed to come to the United States after a federal judge
issued a temporary injunction prohibiting their forcible return. More-
over, as mentioned earlier, thousands more were forcibly returned, often
to face additional persecution.
Indeed, the INS conducted 36,596 screening interviews at Guantd-
namo between October, 1991 and June, 1992 and "screened-in" only 28
percent of these Haitians. t6 And screening rates fluctuated widely
despite the fact that political conditions did not significantly change. In
mid-January, 1992, for example, the INS "screened-in" 85 percent of the
Haitians, but only about 40 percent were "screened in" in February. 7 In
April, after the Court allowed repatriations to continue, the rate dropped
to a record low of two percent. This drop began raising concerns in
Congress.
Several interpreters at Guantdnamo provided sworn statements
detailing a pattern of heavy pressure by U.S. State department Officials
on asylum officers to decrease the number of Haitians "screened-in". A
1992 Harvard Law School report on the asylum process expressed con-
cern that "special foreign policy pressures" had been influencing treat-
ment of the Haitian cases.' 8
In addition, the more than 10,000 Haitians "screened-in" the United
States from Guantdnamo, after INS officials found they had a credible
fear of persecution continued to be in real danger of being denied asy-
15. Despite a December, 1988 presidential proclamation extending the United States
territorial waters from three to twelve miles, Haitians interdicted had to make it to within the three
mile limit.
16. It is believed that about 85 percent of these Haitians reside in South Florida. Less than a
dozen pro bono attorneys were available to work on these cases and many of them could not
devote their time exclusively to the Guantinamo caseload.
17. Asylum officers informally stated that on certain days the "screen-in" rate was close to
100 percent.
18. Even INS officials acknowledged that 10-15 percent of the "screened out" Haitians may
nonetheless be at risk if returned.
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lum. Even before asylum officers had interviewed many of them after
their arrival in the United States, the INS Deputy Commissioner publicly
stated that 90 percent of these cases would probably be denied, a self-
fulfilling prophecy.
Indeed, preliminary assessments by asylum officers in Miami rec-
ommended grants of asylum in thirty-three of the first forty-three Hai-
tian cases. Yet, in a May 26, 1992 memorandum to the Associate
Deputy Attorney General, the Director and Assistant Director of the
Asylum Policy and Review Unit ("APRU") in Washington disagreed
with eighteen of the recommendations to approve, but with only one
recommendation to deny. He also expressed concern that the grant rate
was "higher than expected." To combat this, special incentives were
given to asylum officers to deny these cases, specifying that the "INS
could be encouraged to... [count] a completed denial as a double case
completion and a completed grant as a single case completion for the
purposes of ... officer evaluations."
Many Haitians screened in from Guant6.namo who clearly deserved
asylum have been denied such relief. For example, a young woman who
was beaten and repeatedly raped by a member of the Haitian military
because of her political activity following the 1991 coup d'etat was
nonetheless denied asylum. On December 5, 1997 the Miami Asylum
Office Director stated that the current approval rate for Haitian appli-
cants was less than 15 percent.' 9
In 1994, after mounting pressure from the Congressional Black
Caucus and other groups, President Clinton permitted intercepted Hai-
tians to again be taken to Guantdnamo rather than forcibly repatriated.
According to United States Government officials, Guantainamo's facili-
ties at peak times during 1994-95 held as many as 32,362 Cubans and
21,638 Haitians. While the United States Government paroled into the
United States virtually all of Guantdnamo's Cuban refugees during this
19. In a National Asylum Study Project prepared by the Harvard Law School Immigration
and Refugee Program after the forcible return of the Guantdinamo Haitians, it was found that the
"screened in" Haitians were victims of special scrutiny of their asylum claims upon arrival in the
United States, including heightened legal scrutiny, that Special Department of State investigations
of their asylum claims jeopardized their family members and threatened the confidentiality of their
asylum applications, and that asylum officers often turned what should have been an impartial,
non-adversarial hearing into a hostile credibility examination. One particularly alarming example
of the unfair treatment of these Haitian cases was the following statement in a Notice of Intent to
Deny about the lure of "the luxuries at Guantinamo Bay":
Your testimony is just not plausible. What is more likely is that word had gotten to
your hometown of the free food, medical care, clothing, the chance to get to the
United States, and other luxuries at Guantinamo Bay and you took a chance by
getting on a boat with many other people who were leaving the poverty of Haiti.
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time, it forcibly returned to Haiti virtually all of Guantdnamo's Haitian
refugees.
Among Guantdinamo's Haitian refugees were 356 children who
arrived there unaccompanied by an adult. Most of these children had
witnessed close family members being murdered by Haiti's paramilitary
forces, and some of them had barely escaped Haiti with their own lives.
Many of the children's closest living relatives were in the United States.
While all of their Cuban counterparts had long been admitted to the
United States, by the end of April, 1995 the United States Government
had granted parole to only twenty-three of these Haitian children. Even
in the months before it decided to return President Aristide to power, the
United States Government never seemed to have seriously considered
allowing these children, as a group, to enter the United States. °
The unaccompanied Haitian minors were held at Guantdnamo
under extremely distressing conditions. They were largely isolated from
their family and friends in the outside world, as well as from journalists
and attorneys. They lived largely without information about the outside
world, especially about Haiti, living in several cases without access to
proper medical care or counseling for health-threatening complaints.
The children were housed in leaking tents where many suffered damage
to their few belongings. Some lived without shoes or a change of
clothes, and were awakened at 6 a.m. daily, even on weekends.
Several Haitian children attempted suicide. These attempts
included drinking clorox, hanging by the neck from a tree and inserting
fence wire into the vagina. In response to complaints made by attorneys
who visited the Haitian children in January, 1995, the United States
Atlantic Command acknowledged in March, 1994, that some of its
soldiers had subjected Haitian children to physical and verbal abuse.
["Two soldiers were found to have been involved in isolated cases of
mistreatment. They used excessive force in subduing a number of ado-
lescent Haitians .... The force used included ... flexible plastic hand-
cuffs, and forcing the minors to kneel on the ground for several hours.
Some instances of verbal abuse also occurred."]
Although the United States Government claimed to be acting in the
20. Even Haitian children attempting to come to the United States legally have not been
spared discriminatory treatment. Haitian children eligible for family-sponsored visas were
stranded in Haiti for months following the 1991 coup d'etat, while their applications were
subjected to heightened scrutiny imposed on no other nationality. This group included children
who had lived with their parents in the U.S. for years, attended school here, and had little
familiarity with Haiti or its language. Following a report prepared by attorneys at Florida Rural
Legal Services and at the urging of Congresswoman Carrie Meek (D-FL), Attorney General Janet
Reno granted humanitarian parole to ninety-eight of these children. For more details, see "Haitian
Children Awaiting Visas: A Plea for Help," a report prepared by Cheryl Little and on file with the
Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center.
1999]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
"best interests" of Guantdnamo's unaccompanied Haitian children, it
never explored the strong support system available to these children in
the United States. At the same time, its preparation of a support system
for these children within Haiti seems to have been both indifferent and
incompetent.2 In March of 1995 Amnesty International USA criticized
the United States government for denying the unaccompanied Haitian
children a fair INS screening interview and the right to apply for polit-
ical asylum.
By June, 1995 the majority of these children had been forcibly
repatriated, prompting protests by members of the Congressional Black
Caucus and a number of Hollywood notables. 2 The Attorney General
finally ordered the parole into the United States of most of the remaining
Haitian children at Guantdnamo, a measure that to many seemed too
little, too late.23 Many of the children who were forcibly returned are
living on the streets in Haiti today and are at great risk. At least one
young Haitian girl was brutally raped following her forcible return.
In its 1996 Annual Report, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, Organization of American States, concluded that the
United States's interdiction and repatriation policy toward Haitians vio-
lated the following provisions of the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man: (1) the right to life, (2) the right to liberty, (3) the
right to security of the person, (4) the right to equality before the law, (5)
the right to resort to the courts, and, (6) the right to seek and receive
asylum.
The United States' interdiction, detention and parole policies aptly
call attention to the disparities between our treatment of Cuban and Hai-
tian refugees. In many ways, immigration practices toward Cubans and
Haitians have represented the extremes of United States policy. While
immigration policy toward Cubans tends to be generous and humanita-
rian, even with recent repatriation, immigration policy toward Haitians
tends to be stringent and inhumane.
21. For further details, see "Not in Their Best Interest: A Report on the U.S. Government's
Forcible Repatriation of Guantinamo's Unaccompanied Haitian Children" and supplemental
report, "Unaccompanied Haitian Children Repatriated from Guantdnamo: Stories of Trauma and
Despair," on file at the Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center.
22. Hollywood notables included, among others, Danny Glover, Susan Sarandon, Julia
Roberts, Harry Belafonte, Michelle Pfeiffer, Jack Lemmon, Jonathan Demme, and Gregory Peck.
Even those children fortunate enough to have made it to the United States now find themselves in
a quandary. Absent a grant of political asylum - very difficult to obtain in Haitian cases - most
will be subject to deportation when their parole expires. This is in marked contrast to the Cuban
children paroled from Guantinamo who are eligible for legal United States residency under the
Cuban Adjustment Act a year and a day after their parole.
23. At the urging of attorneys from the Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center and others,
Attorney General Janet Reno eventually paroled five of these children into the United States,
including the young rape victim.
[Vol. 53:717
THE HAITIAN EXPERIENCE
Cubans have constituted a migration stream far larger than Hai-
tians, yet Cubans are routinely paroled into the United States and freed
from detention, while Haitians are not. While Cubans are authorized to
work and eventually obtain permanent resident status, Haitians are sys-
tematically detained and deported. Even when Haitians are released
from detention, they are frequently denied work permits.
The Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act (CAA) of 1966, which permits
Cubans who are paroled or admitted to the United States to apply for
permanent residency one year later, accounts in large measure for the
stark difference in treatment between the two groups. But what makes
this law so remarkable is that it is open-ended, has no cut-off date, and
has not been repealed. Because Cubans are eligible for residency under
the CAA, few have even needed to apply for asylum.
Additionally, Cubans have been eligible to enter the United States
as part of the government-sponsored Refugee Resettlement Program, or
through the sponsorship of the Cuban-American National Foundation.24
No comparable program exists for Haitians.
Although in the past few years the United States has begun
interdicting and returning Cubans attempting to come to the United
States by boat, Cubans have immigration options open to them that are
denied to Haitians. Shipboard screening procedures, while far from per-
fect, are in place for interdicted Cubans, while Haitians are automati-
cally returned without screening. In addition, under an agreement with
the Cuban government, at least 20,000 visas must be given to Cubans to
come to the United States each year.25 As mentioned earlier, Cubans
who are admitted or paroled into the United States may apply for perma-
nent resident status after one year under the Cuban Adjustment Act even
if they came to the United States for purely economic reasons. None of
these options are open to Haitians. Cubans are also exempt from the
recently implemented expedited removal provisions of the immigration
law that passed in 1996.
In the South Florida community, the striking disparity of treatment
between the Cubans and Haitians is frequently evident, and often bor-
ders on the incomprehensible. For example, in July, 1991, an old
24. Under the Refugee Resettlement Program, 1070 Cubans were admitted through the first
eight months of fiscal 1991; under the Cuban-American National Foundation, 1734 Cubans were
admitted as of the end of May, and more than 8500 since the programs' inception in 1988 until
1992. The number of Cubans requesting non-immigrant visas for travel to the United States also
increased steadily over the years. A total of 14,000 Cubans arrived in Florida by plane with
tourist visas in 1990. The United States Immigration and Naturalization Service statistics show
that 30 to 40 percent of these Cubans did not return to Cuba.
25. United States immigration laws also provide annual ceilings for refugee admissions.
Most of the slots for those in Latin America and the Caribbean have gone to the Cubans.
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wooden boat, overloaded with 161 Haitians, came upon two Cubans
bobbing on an inner tube raft. The Haitians rescued the Cubans and
steered towards Miami. The United States Coast Guard stopped the
boat, offering refuge to the two Cubans in Miami and returning the Hai-
tians to Haiti. To exacerbate matters, two days later, five young Haitian
boys who were "stowaways" on board a Honduran freighter arriving in
Miami. The captain, warned by the INS that he would be responsible
should the Haitians escape.26 Were put in heavy chains and cages and
left for hours on the deck of the ship in the parching sun because the
captain had been warned.
Similarly, when in late February, 1993, a Haitian commandeered a
plane to West Palm Beach, claiming he was fleeing political oppression
in Haiti, he was met by an FBI swat team, arrested and charged with air
piracy. Federal public defenders argued that their Haitian client should
be treated like Cuban nationals who had not been prosecuted, even when
they had used force, kidnaping, and hijacking to find freedom in the
United States. The Haitian man was eventually released on bond pend-
ing his trial.
Perhaps the most visible example of the discriminatory treatment of
Haitians in Miami occurred in 1990. Television footage of a demonstra-
tion across from the INS building showed Haitian protestors being bru-
tally beaten by police and at least five bloody Haitians being carried
away. In early February, 1993, as a result of these acts, the City of
Miami agreed to pay $650,000 to fifty-six of these Haitians. Under the
agreement, the City did not admit any guilt in the case.
Lamar Smith has argued that Nicaraguans and Cubans were granted
amnesty because they were allies in the Cold War fight against commu-
nism. This did not surprise attorneys who represent asylum applicants
of different nationalities and are familiar with the differences in treat-
ment accorded to Haitians and other fleeing brutal dictatorships com-
pared to those from communist countries. Relatively mild mistreatment
of Cubans in their homeland, for example, may result in a grant of asy-
lum, while gross mistreatment of Haitians does not.
Historically, State Department opinion letters and reports relied
upon by the INS have minimized the extent of political oppression in
Haiti and taken an unreasonably optimistic view of the political situation
there. The INS has relied upon State Department reports on Haiti even
26. The following year, at the same time politicians in South Florida were screaming about
the prospects of another Mariel and our county's inability to handle any further crisis as a result of
Hurricane Andrew, the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce hosted a two-day conference
attended by federal, state, county, and city officials, to develop a working plan for absorbing
hundreds of thousands of Cuban refugees should Castro fall.
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when they are contradicted by human rights organizations such as
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.27 Ironically, shortly
after Baby Doc Duvalier fled Haiti, a high ranking State Department
official appearing on "Nightline" claimed that the Tonton Macoute -
who had repeatedly been dismissed by The State department as a non-
government entity whose brutal attacks on innocent Haitians therefore
did not rise to the level of political opinion - were Duvalier's own
personal henchmen. Since Aristide's return to Haiti, State Department
reports concluded that country conditions there have changed to such an
extent that asylum should now be routinely denied to Haitians, even for
those who have suffered past persecution and clearly warrant relief.
Congressman Lamar Smith likewise asserts that Haitians who fled Haiti
following the 1991 coup d' 6tat should no longer fear to return since
Haiti is now a democracy.
Unfortunately, however, Haiti today is a fragile democracy at best.
Those who terrorized the masses during the __ have never been
arrested and human rights groups recognize the deteriorating political
situation there. In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
on Immigration on December 17, 1997, Amnesty International officials
indicated that the situation in Haiti is unstable and has worsened in
recent months. "[A]ny one returning to Haiti cannot be assumed that
they will be protected by the existing Haitian justice system... [A]ny
blanket assessment that the change in government can allow all who fled
the country to return without fear of harm is... incorrect in our view."
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees similarly con-
cluded in August, 1997 that "the weakness of Haiti's institutions, inher-
ited from decades of political repression, undermine the capacity of the
State to meet the basic obligation to protect its citizens... This office
believes it would be inappropriate to conclude generally that Haitian
asylum seekers would no longer face persecution upon return to Haiti."
United States relations with Haiti over the years bears mentioning.
American domination of Haiti was first established in 1915 when United
States Marines began a nineteen year occupation of the country. During
the Duvalier family era, the United States supported their rule, money,
weapons, and training flowed from Washington to the Haitian National
Palace.
And even with glaring evidence of abuses committed by the
Duvaliers, United States economic support continued. One week after
27. In assessing the claims of Haitians "screened in" at Guantinamo upon their arrival in the
United States, asylum officers relied on State Department opinion letters, which at times
contradicted Department of State materials, INS Haiti memos, non-governmental source of
documentation, and other State Department opinion letters.
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jailing almost every opponent of Jean Claude Duvalier's government,
Haitian officials sat down with representatives from the United States
and other Western countries, who were the primary donors to the
Duvalier coffers. Despite these abuses, Haiti continued to receive about
137 million dollars in multi-lateral and bi-lateral aid, the United States
remaining by far, the largest contributor to the Haitian budget. United
States aid continued to flow despite the fact that the Haitian government
broke every promise made to the United States in accepting aid. Devel-
opment experts have said that the bottom line regarding foreign assist-
ance to Haiti is it resulted in somewhat less hunger for the poor, but
above all, more prosperity for the ruling families in the Duvalier
dynasty.28
Perhaps the most blatant example of the extent to which politics
affects our treatment of immigrant groups in South Florida followed
Aristide's election, when Haitians requested a permit to celebrate in a
local park and were told by Miami officials that they could do so only so
long as Fidel Castro was not invited to the inauguration in Haiti. Haitian
leaders protested that such a policy violated the First Amendment and
ultimately Miami Mayor Xavier L. Suarez reversed the questionable
restriction on the Haitians' celebration.
Historically, Haitian refugees have had few powerful supporters in
Washington. However, following the 1991 coup in Haiti, both Republi-
cans and Democrats forcefully spoke out on their behalf. But, even with
bipartisan backing for legislation that will grant Haitians relief similar to
that given to those groups who benefited from the Nicaraguan legislation
(NACARA), they have thus far come up short.29
Florida is home to many persons from Central and South America
and the Caribbean who fled political turmoil in their native countries.
Under NACARA, Nicaraguans who arrived as recently as December 1,
1995 are able to apply for permanent residence, regardless of their rea-
sons for coming to the United States. That arrival date is five years after
the Sandinistas were voted out of office. Similarly, Cubans who arrived
before December 1, 1995 will be eligible for permanent residency. This
is an extraordinary victory, because even under the old, more generous
suspension of deportation rules, Nicaraguans and Cubans had to prove 7
28. After Duvalier fled Haiti, lawyers in Miami filed a lawsuit against him and his cohorts,
and a Federal District Court in Miami found that they had pilfered over $500 million in aid meant
for the Haitian people. While this money to date has not been collected, the decision in this case
indicates the extent to which United States financial support to Haiti was misused.
29. Two of Florida's Republican members of Congress, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Lincoln
Diaz-Balart, are Cuban immigrants, and, unlike many of their Republican counterparts, have
fought for the rights of immigrants.
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years of continuous residence in the United States and extreme hardship
if deported to be allowed to remain here.
Salvadorans and Guatemalans fared less well under the new law.
Although their mistreatment by the United States government in the asy-
lum process led to a landmark legal settlement requiring reconsideration
of their cases, they will have only the possibility (but no guarantee) of
suspension of deportation under prior immigration rules. Similarly, peo-
ple from eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union who have been in
the United States since December 31, 1990 will only be eligible for sus-
pension of deportation under the old rules. They too will have to con-
vince judges, on a case-by-case basis, that they, or family members, will
suffer extreme hardship if deported. If denied, they may be deported.
Haitians received neither residence nor the possibility of the sus-
pension of deportation under NACARA, yet many arrived years before
Nicaraguans and Cubans, who will soon be granted residence.
Representative Lamar Smith's argument that, unlike the Haitians,
Nicaraguans and Cubans are deserving of amnesty because their nations
were seized by communist dictators flies in the face of Congress'
attempts to discard favoritism toward those fleeing communist regimes
and to depoliticize refugee policy. The Refugee Act of 1980 was
designed to bring United States law into conformity with international
treaty obligations and to establish objective criteria for determining refu-
gee status.
Even the United States government admits that many Haitians fled
oppression. Thousands are in the United States with the government's
permission after they proved a credible fear of persecution.
Not surprisingly, NACARA - still called the 'Victims of Commu-
nism Relief Act' by some members of Congress - has an ideological
bias which negates the suffering of victims of right-wing regimes. Its
official title, The Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief
Act, belies the sweep of its provisions. Benefits for Cubans slipped into
the provisions for Nicaraguans, and benefits for those from Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union are tucked into the provisions for
Central Americans. It is estimated that 153,000 Nicaraguans and
Cubans, most of whom reside in South Florida, will get their green cards
as a result of this law.
But, the new law does not just deliver an extraordinarily good deal
to some; it also makes things worse for all those not specifically
included in its provisions.
Last summer, Attorney General Janet Reno vacated a harsh Board
of Immigration Appeals decision which had changed the rules for per-
sons applying for suspension of deportation and made new, harsh provi-
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sions retroactive. This was an across-the-board decision, which applied
equally to all nationalities. The new NACARA legislation cancels the
Attorney General's decision and makes the harsh provisions of the new
immigration law passed in 1996 retroactive. For example, Alexandra
Charles, a nineteen year old Haitian girl who witnessed her parents'
murder in Haiti, would have been eligible for suspension of deportation
under the Attorney General's decision but now, as a price of the new
legislation, she is not.
Nicaraguans and Cubans are certainly deserving of amnesty and
justified in celebrating their good fortune. It is important, however, to
look at how legislation that is so beneficial to them, at the same time,
hurts others. The new law is divisive and discriminatory. It pits one
group against the other, and gives benefits to some nationalities at the
expense of others. This has an especially large impact upon a commu-
nity like South Florida which is home to so many similarly situated
groups who have fled political oppression and established lives here.
The Haitians responded passionately to their omission in the new
laws in large part because they believed they were going to be included.
In a matter of forty-eight hours after NACARA's passage, Haitians col-
lected 20,000 signatures on a petition asking for equal treatment. A
number of rallies, in which thousands participated, followed.
As a partial explanation for the disparate treatment, Haitians were
told that Nicaraguan government officials had urged the Clinton Admin-
istration to grant the Nicaraguans amnesty because, if tens of thousands
of Nicaraguans were deported, it would create enormous economic
instability in Nicaragua. To Haitians this only strengthened their own
case, as Haiti's fragile economic situation is no secret. Haitians in the
United States reportedly send up to $500 million to Haiti a year. So like
his Central American counterparts, Haiti's President Rene Preval wrote
to President Clinton, highlighting the destabilizing effect the return of
thousands of Haitians would have on Haiti and asking for equal
treatment.
Congress also claimed that despite the recent establishment of dem-
ocratically elected governments in Nicaragua, Cuba, El Salvador, Guate-
mala, and specified Eastern European nations, many of these nationals
had built equities here, and therefore deserved an opportunity to remain.
The Haitians argued that they too built businesses, paid taxes, and,
raised their families in South Florida. They contribute to our communi-
ties and enrich the ethnic diversity of our state. So too have Hondurans,
Asians and others excluded in NACARA.
Haitians excluded from this latest round of amnesty provisions
were reminded of an earlier time when they had to struggle against effort
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to deny them U.S. residency. In a decision subsequently upheld by the
United States Supreme Court in February, 1991, a federal district court
judge ruled that Haitians who sought to legalize their status under the
farm worker amnesty program of 1986 were denied a "meaningful
opportunity to be heard." Based on the largest, most ambitious fraud
investigation ever undertaken by the INS, the United States government
charged mostly poor, uneducated Haitian farm workers with committing
fraud in their applications for residency under the amnesty program
("Operation Cucumber"). Federal judges hearing criminal charges
against the Haitians criticized the government for bringing the charges,
and the government was forced to dismiss all of the cases.
If there is a silver lining here, it is that in South Florida,
Nicaraguans, Cubans, African Americans, and others, have raised their
voices on behalf of the Haitians. Groups that seldom, if ever, communi-
cated in any meaningful way before, in part because each group was so
busy trying to deal with its own problems, are now doing so and learning
they have far more in common than differences, and that there is
strength in unity. Moreover, Haitians and their advocates are calling for
equal treatment for the Guatemalans, Salvadorans, Hondurans and others
similarly situated as well.
Democrats and Republicans have also renewed their efforts in
recent months on behalf of the Haitians. Al Cardenas, Vice Chairman of
the Florida Republican Party, along with Ana Navarro, a leading Nicara-
guan American activist, and African American County Commissioners
have called upon legislative officials "to do the right thing" for the Hai-
tians, pointing to the many benefits such legislation would provide for
South Florida. The Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce introduced a
resolution on August 18, 1998, endorsing legislation to grant relief to the
Haitians, claiming that the wholesale deportation of Haitians "would
upset the balance of our diverse citizenry which gives us our strength in
the global economy." This deportation, they argued, would further
destabilize Haiti's fragile political and economic situation, thereby
increasing the number of Haitian refugees fleeing Haiti in the future.
On June 18, 1998, the Roman Catholic Bishops of Florida asked for
compassionate and just treatment of the Haitians for similar reasons.
The Congressional Black Caucus and leaders of the Hispanic Caucus
have also called for equal treatment.
Congresswoman Carrie Meek (D-FL) has long led the battle to pro-
vide equal treatment for the Haitians. Her latest effort began in the
spring of 1997, when she and members of a Miami-Dade delegation met
with Attorney General Janet Reno to discuss including Haitians in pro-
posed changes to the Illegal Immigration and Reform and Immigrant
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Responsibility Act of 1996. NACARA's architects maintained that if
the Haitians were included the bill would die, and supporters of the Hai-
tians in Congress agreed to permit the Central American refugee relief
legislation to move forward without including them. The Administra-
tion then agreed, in December, 1997, to provide temporary relief for
Haitian nationals pending further Congressional action and granted
Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) to Haitians who were paroled into
the United States or applied for asylum prior to December 31, 1995.
These Haitians are protected from deportation for one year while Haitian
advocates work to obtain more permanent, legislative relief.
On April 23, 1998, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved the
Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act, 1504, which was introduced
by Florida Senators Graham (D-FL) and Mack (R-FL). This bill would
grant permanent residency to an estimated 40,000 Haitians who were
paroled into the United States or who applied for asylum prior to
December 31, 1995. (Approximately 10,490 Haitians were paroled into
the United States between 1990-1997 and 42,856 Haitians applied for
political asylum). At the mark up of this bill, Senators Spencer Abra-
ham (R-MI) and Edward Kennedy (D-MA) introduced a substitute bill
similar to the Graham-Mack bill but which would also include a small
group (about one thousand to two thousand) of unaccompanied children
and orphans. The substitute bill was passed by unanimous vote and now
moves to the full Senate for consideration. The Senators were assured
by the Administration that Haitians will not be deported while Congress
considers this measure.
The Senate bill is one of several that has been introduced to provide
relief to Haitians who currently find themselves in legal limbo. On the
House side there are three additional bills, none of which have yet been
marked up in subcommittee or committee. Representative Carrie Meek
introduced the most generous bill, HR 3033, which would give "green
cards" to any Haitian in the United States as of December 31, 1995. It is
estimated that some 100,000 Haitians, many in South Florida, would be
affected. Only this bill provides equity for the Haitians. 30 But even
Representative Meek has conceded it has little chance of passing. Rep-
resentative John Conyers (D-MI) has introduced a companion bill (HR
3049) to Senators Graham and Meek's bill. Another bill, introduced by
Representative Luis Gutierrez (D-IL), HR 3054, would grant permanent
residency to Salvadorans and Guatemalans who were covered in
30. While the number of Haitians who would obtain relief if they were granted equal
treatment with the Cubans and Nicaraguans under NACARA is somewhat larger than what is
proposed in the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act, that number is still far fewer than the
number of Cubans and Nicaraguans granted amnesty.
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NACARA and to Haitians in the United States as of December 31, 1995.
[A delegation of Guatemalans from South Florida traveled to Washing-
ton in July of this year to ask Congress to grant permanent residence to
more than 180,000 undocumented Guatemalans now subject to
deportation].
The battle to provide equal treatment for the Haitians is far from
over. While it is heartening that key Republicans such as Senators Con-
nie Mack, Spencer Abraham, and Alfonse D'Amato, and Representa-
tives Jack Kemp, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Lincoln Diaz-Balart have
taken up the cause, Lamar Smith's persistent efforts to convince the pub-
lic that the Haitians do not deserve help poses a serious problem.
Next year is an election year which means immigrant bashing may
again become popular. The White House's commitment to new legisla-
tion is unclear and the United States military action in Haiti has made it
hard for the United States to acknowledge the desperate political and
economic situation there.
Representative Smith has misrepresented the history of the United
States policy toward Haitians. His revisionist version of events should
not be an excuse for denying Haitians equal treatment now. The Rever-
end Jesse Jackson more aptly described the plight of the Haitians when
he claimed that they have been "trapped between the tyranny at home
and the abandonment and rejection of the American people."
Nicaraguan activists have said that Republican members of Con-
gress carried out a jihad in obtaining legal status for them. Let's hope
they do that now for Haitians and others excluded and punished by the
new law.
Our responsibility to protect persons among us who have fled polit-
ical persecution should not depend on politics. Similarly situated immi-
grant groups should be treated equally. Nicaraguans and Cubans who
arrived in the United States as of December, 1995 will be given resi-
dence under the new law. Haitians deserve no less than that.
1999]
